City University of New York (CUNY)

CUNY Academic Works
Publications and Research

CUNY School of Law

2015

Re-Integrating Community Space: The Legal and Social Meanings
of Reclaiming Abandoned Space in New York's Lower East Side
Andrea McArdle
CUNY School of Law

How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know!
More information about this work at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu/cl_pubs/70
Discover additional works at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu
This work is made publicly available by the City University of New York (CUNY).
Contact: AcademicWorks@cuny.edu

Savannah

Law Review
VOLUME 2

NUMBER 1

[Re]Integrating Community Space: The Legal and
Social Meanings of Reclaiming Abandoned Space
in New York’s Lower East Side
Andrea McArdle*
What understandings about property, the community concerns informing it,
and the legal relationships that flow from it can we draw from a city’s buildings
and spaces? What contending values and expectations underpin laws that
concomitantly protect property interests and seek to advance public safety,
health, and economic well-being in urban neighborhoods? What explanatory
narratives can advocates, analysts, and policymakers discern from such laws? If,
as Jane Jacobs might attest, a city’s “buildings and streetscapes encapsulate[]
information” that engages its viewers and users,1 these forms contribute to the
meaning we derive from city spaces.
This Article argues that the meaning we can draw from these buildings and
streetscapes as they have been constructed, abandoned, or refashioned over time
is complex and multifaceted. Using New York City’s Lower East Side landscape
as exemplary text, the Article identifies various narratives of regulatory burden,
scarcity, abandonment, transgression, and renewal that recur in the discourse of
property law, and it considers ways in which local government institutions
contribute to the shape of those narratives as regulators, service providers, and
owners of property.
The Article begins with a brief account of conditions in the late 1960s and
early 1970s that contributed to public and private disinvestment in the storied
Lower East Side, a site of intense immigrant settlement at the turn of the
*

Professor of Law, City University of New York School of Law.
The quotation is part of a set of reflections on urbanist Jane Jacobs’
penchant for drawing meaning from a city’s buildings and infrastructure. See
Robert Sirman, Built Form and the Metaphor of Storytelling, in What We See:
Advancing the Observations of Jane Jacobs 159, 161 (2010).
1
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twentieth century,2 and, in the 1950s and 1960s, a space that attracted writers,
artists, and political activists. 3 Public disinvestment in local communities
resulted from New York’s fiscal crisis and its inability to maintain previous
levels of municipal services.4 Private disinvestment entailed owners’ exploitation
and failure to maintain their properties, which was often followed by tax
delinquencies and foreclosures, abandonment, or arson. 5 The Article then
addresses how these conditions also afforded an opportunity for reclaiming
devalued land and distressed neighborhoods. Beginning in the mid-1970s,
neighborhood-initiated cultivation of gardens in vacant, burnt-out lots 6 and
homesteading occupants’ refurbishing of buildings that had fallen into disrepair7
created a new source of investment in city-owned property, holding out the
promise of community stabilization.
This Article examines the legal implications of these autonomous, self-help
responses to disinvestment. Initially, the City supported and legitimized
community gardeners’ and homesteaders’ efforts at reclamation.8 However,
when land values rose in the 1980s and 1990s, the City reversed course and
invoked laws limiting access to property as the City sought to auction off
community gardens that operated under revocable licenses 9 and to evict
homesteaders as trespassers.10 In response, local residents also invoked law’s
authority. Gardeners sought redress under legal theories alleging violations of
environmental law and civil rights.11 Squatters and homesteaders asserted rights
as adverse possessors.12 Although these legal claims proved unavailing, by 2002,
agreements negotiated on behalf of these claimants permanently protected some
community gardens from development 13 and afforded occupants of eleven
2
Christopher Mele, Selling the Lower East Side:
Culture, Real Estate, and Resistance in New York City 45
(2000); Janet L. Abu-Lughod, Introduction to From Urban Village to
East Village: The Battle for New York’s Lower East Side 1, 4
(Janet L. Abu-Lughod ed., 1994).
3
Mele, supra note 2, at 140-45, 158-66.
4
Id. at 190-91; see also William K. Tabb, The Long Default: New
York City and the Urban Fiscal Crisis 30-35 (1982).
5
Neil Smith, Betsy Duncan & Laura Reid, From Disinvestment to
Reinvestment: Mapping the Urban ‘Frontier’ on the Lower East Side, in From
Urban Village to East Village: The Battle for New York’s
Lower East Side 149, 149-52 (Janet L. Abu-Lughod ed., 1994); see also
Mele, supra note 2, at 191-200.
6
Mele, supra note 2, at 208, 210; Robert Fox Elder, Protecting New York
City’s Community Gardens, 13 N.Y.U. Envtl. L.J. 769, 773-76 (2005).
7
Mele, supra note 2, at 204-11.
8
Id. at 210-11.
9
Elder, supra note 6, at 776-77.
10
Mele, supra note 2, at 273-76, 299-301.
11
Elder, supra note 6, at 777-83.
12
Thomas J. Lueck, Police Evict Squatters from Three City-Owned Tenements
in the East Village, N.Y. Times (Aug. 14, 1996), http://www.nytimes.com/
1996/08/14/nyregion/police-evict-squatters-from-three-city-owned-tenementsin-the-east-village.html.
13
Elder, supra note 6, at 785-88.
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squatted buildings a new legal status as shareholders of limited-equity
cooperative housing.14
Drawing on these developments, this Article addresses how such
community efforts to reengage with threatened urban landscapes generate legal
meaning. It discusses how the recently opened Museum of Reclaimed Urban
Space (MORUS), which is literally built into a formerly squatted building in
New York’s Lower East Side,15 both portrays and adds to that meaning-making.
By illuminating the particular ways in which the owners and users of these
contested spaces invoked both property law and community norms, MORUS
documents how the squatter and community garden movements helped
reintegrate distressed city buildings and lots as community spaces. The Article
concludes with reflection on the continued work of MORUS to demonstrate how
the impulse to reclaim space also inevitably transforms it.
I.

The Narrative of Property at Risk: Public and Private Disinvestment

By the early 1970s, New York and most cities in the northeastern and
midwestern United States had suffered a severe decline in their manufacturing
sectors, which relocated mainly to nonunionized and less heavily regulated
jurisdictions in the American South and offshore.16 The resulting reductions in
New York City’s tax base and employment levels placed pressure on City
residents’ ability to pay for housing and challenged the City’s capacity to meet
its day-to-day operating expenses. Property owners, particularly in lower-income
neighborhoods, responded in part by disinvestment—a deliberate set of
behaviors, including a failure to pay taxes or make debt payments, to make
needed repairs, or to deliver basic services such as providing heat.17
The dynamics of ownership, investment, and disinvestment in residential
property in New York City includes a longstanding system of rent regulation,
which places limits on what landlords may charge for multifamily housing.18
Originating in housing shortages during World War II and the immediate postwar period, rent regulation initially consisted of rent control, which covered
properties built before February 1947. 19 The scope of this regulation was
augmented by the enactment in 1969 of a rent stabilization law that principally
14
See, e.g., Paula Crossfield, Sweat Equity Pays Off, The Brooklyn Rail
(Nov. 2, 2006), http://www.brooklynrail.org/2006/11/streets/sweat-equitypays-off; Bullet Space is the First of the Former LES Squats to Take Over
Ownership of Building from City, EV Grieve (May 12, 2009, 7:00 AM),
http://www.evgrieve.com/2009/05/bullet-space-is-first-of-former-les.html.
15
Colin Moynihan, Sharing a Part of Activist History in the East Village,
N.Y. Times (Mar. 4, 2012, 3:14 PM), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/05/
nyregion/east-village-museum-shares-a-piece-of-activist-history.html?ref=
nyregion.
16
Mele, supra note 2, at 126-29; Tabb, supra note 4, at 71-77; AbuLughod, supra note 2, at 1-2.
17
Smith et al., supra note 5, at 149-52.
18
Introduction, N.Y. St. Homes & Cmty. Renewal, http://www.
nyshcr.org/Rent/about.htm#intro (last visited July 24, 2014).
19
Id.
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applied to rental housing of six or more units completed after February 1, 1947,
and before January 1, 1974.20
The expanding landscape of rent regulation was, in turn, blamed for
property owners’ declining revenues and declining willingness to invest in rental
properties,21 although it seems equally likely that these landlords’ decisions to
disinvest in rental properties may have been driven by the existence of other,
higher-yielding investment options.22 In 1971, the perception of burdensome
property regulation was inscribed in law when the New York State legislature
enacted the Urstadt Law,23 a measure that restricted the City’s authority to
strengthen existing rental regulations or to extend them to unregulated
properties.24 In the words of New York State’s high court, this legislation was
intended to “encourage owners to invest in the maintenance and improvement
of existing housing units and thereby help to stem the tide of abandonment of
sound buildings in the City.”25
The Urstadt Law accounted for the challenges of property ownership in
terms of the impact of rent regulation on the revenues that an owner could
realize from investing in property. By 1974, however, it was clear that the
economics of property ownership in New York City was more complicated than
a regulatory-burden explanation would suggest, as it was exacerbated by
developments beyond the confines of New York City and even New York
State.26 At that time, the national economy was in a recession, triggered by
adverse changes in the position of the U.S. dollar in international trade and
precipitous increases in the price of oil imported from the Middle East.27 These
developments impacted New York City through an increase in unemployment
levels tied to a plummeting of manufacturing jobs, which, in turn, increased the
need for services and also created a downturn in the real estate sector that
eventually resulted in tax arrears causing a loss of City revenues.28
These developments led to further deterioration of neighborhoods,
particularly those housing less-resourced residents, and reinforced patterns of
disinvestment in residential buildings among landlords already disinclined to
20
Id. In addition, tenants in New York City buildings completed before
February 1, 1947, but who began residency after June 30, 1971, are covered
under rent stabilization regulations, as are buildings with three or more
residential units that were built or substantially renovated on or after January 1,
1974, with “special” designated tax benefits. Id. Buildings receiving these tax
benefits usually remain under regulation while the benefits are in effect, or, in
some instances, until the tenant terminates the tenancy. Id..
21
Tabb, supra note 4, at 90-91.
22
Id. at 89 (noting rising interest rates and gentrification).
23
N.Y. Unconsol. Law § 8605 (McKinney 2014).
24
Id. at 1.
25
In re KSLM-Columbus Apts., Inc. v. New York State Div. of Hous. &
Cmty Renewal, 835 N.E.2d 643, 648 (2005) (quoting City of New York v. New
York State Div. of Hous. & Cmty Renewal, 765 N.E.2d 829,835 (2001)).
26
Abu-Lughod, supra note 2, at 1.
27
Abu-Lughod, supra note 2, at 1-2.
28
Id. at 2.
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maintain their properties.29 The buildup of tax arrears eventually led to tax
foreclosures that brought properties under City ownership.30 Other buildings
were abandoned by landlords who concluded that it was not profitable to invest
resources in them.31 A number of these properties were destroyed or badly
damaged as a result of arson—an outcome perhaps also connected to the
perceived lack of profitability.32 By the mid-1970s, the City increasingly held the
unsought status of property owner but lacked the wherewithal or the inclination
to maintain the ravaged lots and the abandoned or tax-foreclosed properties that
had fallen under its ownership.33
As revenue losses exceeded the City’s burgeoning expenses, the City
incurred an increasing level of short-term debt to make up for these shortfalls. In
late 1974, the City held 29% of total short-term notes issued in the United States,
and by 1975, the City’s short-term debt constituted 36.9% of its total debt.34
Moreover, the City’s ability to borrow had become tied in part to questionable
budgetary practices based on overly generous, though unrealistic, revenue
estimates and invasion of its capital reserves to pay ongoing operating expenses.35
As the investment sector became uneasy with the City’s approach to borrowing
and spending, investment banks began decreasing their holdings of City bonds.36
By the summer of 1975, it was widely believed that the City was “sliding toward
bankruptcy.”37
These conditions triggered New York State and federal measures in the
second half of 1975, which placed unprecedented strictures on the City’s
finances. The State measures comprised: the Municipal Assistance Corporation
(MAC), a public entity that issued short-term bonds on behalf of the City;38 the
Emergency Financial Control Board, which assumed control of the City’s
budgeting, borrowing, and spending for a three-year period;39 the short-lived
Moratorium Act, which permitted the City to delay paying—and to lower the
amount of interest due—on its short-term notes;40 and a tax package that
increased City and State taxes.41 This new stringency also entailed the City’s
laying off workers, reducing services, raising transit fares,42 charging increased

Id.
Smith et al., supra note 5, at 153-55.
31
Mele, supra note 2, at 191-200.
32
Id. at 192-93; Tabb, supra note 4, at 94-96.
33
Mele, supra note 2, at 200.
34
Seymour P. Lachman & Robert Polner, The Man Who
Saved New York: Hugh Carey and the Great Fiscal Crisis of
1975 104 (2010).
35
Lachman & Polner, supra note 34, at 112; Tabb, supra note 4, at 2324.
36
Lachman & Polner, supra note 34, at 104-05.
37
Id. at 113.
38
Id. at 114-15.
39
Id. at 129.
40
Id. at 162.
41
Id. at 163.
42
Tabb, supra note 4, at 34-35.
29
30
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fees and eventually tuition at the formerly free City University of New York,43
and the commitment of the City’s five municipal unions to invest pension funds
in MAC-issued debt.44 After initial resistance and a prominent public scolding of
the City’s failure to rein in spending,45 in December 1975, President Gerald Ford
signed legislation that authorized seasonal federal loans. This measure enabled
the City to avoid shortfalls resulting from time lags in revenue collections vis-àvis when obligations became due.46
This regime of restructuring responded to, and also reinforced, a dominant
narrative of City profligacy, swollen government, excessive union leverage, and a
failed capacity to make the difficult choices that would be required to bring
spending in line with revenues.47 Nonetheless, within City government and
among municipal unions, a counter-narrative resonated: the investment banks
had precipitated the fiscal crisis by selling off their holdings of City notes, which,
in turn, contributed to a perception that the securities issued by or on behalf of
the City were unsound and an unacceptable investment risk.48 This narrative
implied that the banks had pressed for a resolution that privileged investors’
financial well-being over the needs of the City’s more vulnerable populations. 49
Of these contending understandings of property—and of whose property most
mattered—the banking sector’s theme of fiscal discipline over City recalcitrance
acquired more traction.50
The City’s retrenchment continued with the election of Mayor Edward
Koch in 1977. A second round of discussions with federal officials led to the New
York City Loan Guarantee Act of 1978,51 which was needed to contain the
continuing risk of default.52 Municipal unions were again asked to invest a
significant portion of pension funds into municipal bonds and notes. 53
Reductions in municipal services were extensive,54 particularly in the City’s lessresourced neighborhoods, where private disinvestment and abandonment were
also ongoing.55 Under these conditions, members of disenfranchised, disinvested
communities in the City resorted to an alternative investment strategy: self-help.

Id. at 49-53.
Lachman & Polner, supra note 34, at 132-33, 163-64.
45
Id. at 109-10.
46
Id. at 164-65.
47
See Tabb, supra note 4, at 31-33, 59-66; see also Lachman & Polner,
supra note 34, at 109-10, 128-32.
48
Tabb, supra note 4, at 24-25.
49
Id. at 25.
50
Id. at 35.
51
Id. at 32; see also New York City Loan Guarantee Act of 1978, Pub. L. No.
95-339, 92 Stat. 460.
52
Tabb, supra note 4, at 31-32.
53
Id. at 32.
54
Lachman & Polner, supra note 34, at 130.
55
Mele, supra note 2, at 212.
43

44
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II. New Investment: Reclaiming Property through Community Sweat Equity
Strait-jacketed by continuing revenue shortfalls and the austerity regime
imposed by New York State, the federal government, and the investment sector,
the City relied on its enterprising residents to reinvest in the deteriorating built
environment, principally through their own labor. In the late 1970s, the City
launched programs that permitted homesteading under the auspices of the
Division of Alternative Management Program (DAMP), thus supporting a
tenant’s capacity to rehabilitate and assume a cooperative ownership interest in
formerly City–owned buildings.56 Non-profit organizations such as the Urban
Homesteading Assistance Board (UHAB) and Adopt-a-Building helped these
homesteaders acquire the skills needed to manage real estate.57 Homesteaders’
status typically was distinguished from that of squatters because squatters
occupied buildings without the authorization of the City.58 Before the real estate
sector began to reinvest in the Lower East Side in the 1980s, however, squatters
who occupied property and took some steps to improve it generally were allowed
to remain.59
Relatedly, the squalid conditions accompanying private and public
disinvestment in the 1970s left vacant lots as eyesores and spurred community
residents to initiate another form of sweat equity: cultivating and converting the
lots into verdant, vegetation-filled oases. The gardens contributed needed green
space, enhanced the appearance of neighborhoods, and furnished communities
with gathering places for residents beleaguered by the combined effects of
physical deterioration and crime.60 Community-based organizations such as
Green Guerrillas supported the launch of gardens, 61 and, since 1978, the City has
provided technical support and advice through the GreenThumb licensing
program,62 a program that sanctions community efforts to occupy and use Cityowned land until the City designates its intention to develop a site.63
Id. at 206-07.
Id. An early example was 519 East Eleventh Street on the Lower East
Side, a building that had been abandoned and damaged by arson, and located
along a street dubbed Stripper’s Row, where stripping cars was a nightly
pastime. Shayla Love, The Almost Forgotten Story of the 1970s East Village
Windmill, Gothamist (Sept. 20, 2014, 10:55 AM),
http://gothamist.com/2014/09/29/east_village_windmill_nyc.php#photo-1.
Armed with a low-cost loan and funding under the Comprehensive Employment
and Training Act to compensate (partly) and train residents in building
construction skills, the newly formed UHAB offered the route to residents’
eventual apartment ownership, which also entailed their investing hours of
“sweat equity.” Id.
58
Mele, supra note 2, at 207.
59
See id.
60
Id. at 208, 210.
61
Elder, supra note 6, at 775.
62
Id. at 776-77.
63
See, e.g., N.Y.C. Envtl. Justice Alliance v. Giuliani, 50 F. Supp. 2d 250,
252 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (denying a motion to enjoin City from auctioning off
parcels of land containing 600 community gardens) (discussed in Elder, supra
note 6, at 781-85); cf. Memorandum of Agreement between the State of New
56
57
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By these largely self-help efforts during the City’s fiscal crisis, the
homesteaders, squatters, and gardeners signaled their intention to invest in the
devastated spaces of their neighborhoods and reintegrate them as community
spaces. These affirmative acts should also be understood as a form of resistance,
a way of returning disinvested properties to their communities.64 In this sense,
those engaging in sweat equity not only sought to realize personal goals to have a
plot of land or a patch of earth to till, but also sought to reclaim for their
communities the buildings and spaces lost as a consequence of disinvestment.65
In the late 1970s, when the City was under the yoke of the Emergency
Financial Control Board and the real estate sector had not yet reawakened
interest in the Lower East Side, the fiscal logic of permitting and promoting
homesteading, squatting, and community gardening seemed clear. The City both
helped preserve these buildings and spaces from further deterioration and
facilitated community-based initiatives without incurring substantial expenses
itself. When the City’s fiscal pressures eased and real estate interests sought to
redevelop the Lower East Side, the City wavered in its support for these
programs.66 Community members who offered their labor to improve dilapidated
City-owned spaces no longer could assume that they held a legitimate status.67
Instead, the City sought to evict the occupants of squatted and homesteaded
buildings and sell off the buildings as well as the garden lots.68
The City’s shift in position triggered a range of responses, from civil
disobedience to litigation.69 The City advanced affirmative claims during these
legal skirmishes that centered on traditional understandings of a property
owner’s right to exclude,70 and its corollary, that those to be excluded were
either trespassers or otherwise subject to the withdrawal at will of any existing
rights to possess or use City property. Those challenging the City developed

York and the City of New York regarding the GreenThumb Program, §§ 4-6
(Sept. 17, 2002), available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/om/pdf/community_
gardens_agreement.pdf (compromise immunizing some New York City garden
lots from development) (discussed in Elder, supra note 6, at 786-87).
64
Mele, supra note 2, at 210; Alan W. Moore, The Opening of the MORUS
Museum Was an Unexpected Surprise, in Museum of Reclaimed Urban
Space Opening — A Moment’s Catalog December 8, 2012, 6a-b
(Benjamin Shepard ed., 2013).
65
Mele, supra note 2, at 210.
66
Id. at 210-11; see also William Sites, Public Action: New York City Policy
and the Gentrification of the Lower East Side, in From Urban Village to
East Village: The Battle for New York’s Lower East Side
189, 200-01 (Janet L. Abu-Lughod ed., 1994).
67
See Mele, supra note 2, at 240-41.
68
Id.
69
Id. at 260-62.
70
See, e.g., Moore v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 509 (1990)
(Mosk, J., dissenting) (“[T]he concept of property is often said to refer to a
‘bundle of rights’ . . . principally the rights to possess the property, to use the
property, to exclude others from the property, and to dispose of the property by
sale or by gift.”).
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theories of individual rights rooted in community-based interests, which courts
struggled with and typically rejected.
III. Legal Maneuvers and Legal Narratives: Theorizing Community Investment
When, by the 1990s, land values in the Lower East Side escalated to the
point of fully engaging developers’ interests, the mayoral administration of
Rudolph Giuliani redoubled efforts to remove the occupants from the not-fullylivable structures that nonetheless functioned as home for some.71 And during
these same years, the City first stopped issuing new GreenThumb licenses to
City lot gardeners, then denied renewal requests for expired licenses,72 and
began selling the lots at auction to developers, in many cases for the purpose of
building affordable housing.73 By the late 1990s, three lawsuits asserting a range
of theories and narratives for understanding the community value of garden
space helped shape the meaning that litigants, lawyers, and legal institutions
could draw from the auctions.74 These lawsuits illustrate the challenges when
two vital urban aims are in tension: providing affordable housing and promoting
preservation of green space in neighborhoods previously lacking such benefits.75
A. Situating Community Gardens and Community Interests in a Legal
Framework
A lawsuit challenging the withdrawal of garden lots from the Lower East
Side and other City neighborhoods was brought by a local organization asserting
interests that reflected the meaning derived from the use value of the abandoned
lots to the gardeners. In In re New York City Coalition for the Preservation of
Gardens v. Giuliani,76 plaintiffs argued that the City was required to subject
proposed construction of moderate- and middle-income cooperative and
condominium housing units on the garden sites to environmental review under
New York State and municipal laws before releasing the lots for sale to
developers.77 The court drew on conventional property-related concepts and
concluded that the challengers lacked standing—either because they were
gardening without a license or gardening with a GreenThumb license that was
expressly revocable.78

Mele, supra note 2, at 299.
Elder, supra note 6, at 776-77.
73
Id. at 777; see e.g., In re N.Y.C. Coal. for the Pres. of Gardens v. Giuliani,
670 N.Y.S.2d 654 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1997); N.Y.C. Envtl. Justice Alliance v.
Guiliani, 50 F. Supp. 2d 250, 251-52 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); N.Y.C. Envtl. Justice
Alliance v. Giuliani, 214 F.3d 65, 68-70 (2d Cir. 2000) (cited in Elder, supra
note 6, at 777-85).
74
Elder, supra note 6, at 777-85 (addressing this tension and describing the
cases).
75
Id.
76
670 N.Y.S.2d 654 (N.Y. Sup.Ct. 1997) (cited in Elder, supra note 6, at
777-85).
77
In re N.Y.C. Coal. for the Pres. of Gardens, 670 N.Y.S.2d at 657-58.
78
Id. at 659.
71

72
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Nonetheless, the court went on to address the merits of their challenge,
interpreting the statutes at issue to permit exemption of the new construction
from environmental review on the understanding that the new structures would
replace a preexisting use. 79 It specifically rejected the contention that the
intervening use of the lots as gardens disqualified the proposed construction as
replacement housing and similarly disregarded the plaintiffs’ point that the
gardened lots were not in fact “vacant,” as they had been classified by City
housing officials.80 In the court’s view, these uses were, at best, “temporary,”
and, in some cases, unlicensed interruptions of a preexisting use.81 Turning to a
separate claim under the General Municipal Law, the court noted the imperative
of returning a “neighborhood as quickly and economically as possible to its
original character.”82 For the court, then, the use of the lots as gardens by
predominantly low-income communities of color had no independent legal
meaning.83
A subsequent lawsuit brought by the New York City Environmental Justice
Alliance challenged the sale of gardens that would make way for affordable and
market-rate housing, senior care facilities, and some commercial space.84 Here,
plaintiffs developed a potentially more promising theory that eschewed property
concepts in favor of a federal civil rights paradigm.85 The complaint alleged that
the auctioning of gardens violated community members’ rights under federal
regulations adopted to implement Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 196486
Specifically, these regulations barred use of methods in implementing a program
that would have a discriminatory effect on the basis of race, color, national
origin, or sex.87
Ruling on a motion for a preliminary injunction, the District Court for the
Southern District of New York concluded that plaintiffs were unlikely to succeed
on the merits, in part because they lacked clear authority to bring a private right
of action.88 Affirming, the Second Circuit principally focused on the absence of
sufficient evidence that the closing of gardens caused a disparate adverse effect
on persons of color living nearby.89 The court’s emphasis on the failure of proof
of racial discrimination invites consideration whether the court might have
accepted an environmentally framed racial injustice narrative if supported with
adequate evidence. Such a narrative might have achieved greater legal resonance
than one based on property use and environmental regulation, since

Id. at 660-61.
Id. at 659-61.
81
Id. at 660-61.
82
Id. at 661 (cited in Elder, supra note 6, at 777-85).
83
Id. at 665.
84
N.Y.C. Envtl. Justice Alliance, 50 F. Supp. 2d at 251-52 (cited in Elder,
supra note 6, at 781-83).
85
Id. at 252-53.
86
42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1988).
87
N.Y.C. Envtl. Justice Alliance, 50 F. Supp. 2d at 252-53.
88
Id. at 252, 255.
89
N.Y.C. Envtl. Justice Alliance, 214 F.3d at 68-70.
79

80
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understandings about property rights and their limitations have accrued and
solidified over time, whereas civil rights jurisprudence continues to evolve.90
The third suit, initiated in 1999 by then New York State Attorney General
Eliot Spitzer, returned to a theory based on environmental protection claims to
challenge the sale of the garden lots, which the State was authorized to
vindicate.91 The complaint also sought to re-categorize older gardens as parkland
under New York State law, which would insulate them from sale to developers.92
This use of property-preserving concepts to protect community assets pointed to
the possibility of aligning the values underpinning property and community.93
This lawsuit was settled in 2002, at the dawn of a new mayoral administration.
The State and the City of New York agreed to protect some gardens
permanently, and allowed others to remain available for development after sites
undergo an environmental impact review and a garden review process to help
gardeners locate alternate sites, if available.94
B. Self-Help and the Law: The Shifting Legal Status of Homesteading and
Squatting
As it had done in response to community gardens, the City in the mid-tolate-1970s supported homesteading programs that substituted tenants’ sweat
equity for the City’s investments of its resources in the casualties of the fiscal
crisis.95 In those years before New York City land values had recovered, the
burnt-out shells of residential buildings became laboratories for shared living,
and self-help, and, on one occasion, the site of ingenious experiments in
alternative energy, including a windmill that supplied electricity to a
homesteaded building at 519 East Eleventh Street on the Lower East Side.96
These experiments raised property issues, but perhaps the most impactful
legal challenge faced by the early homesteaders did not emanate from the City.
90
See Eduardo Moisés Peñalver & Sonia K. Katyal,
Property Outlaws: How Squatters, Pirates, and Protesters
Improve the Law of Ownership 15-16 (2010).
91
State of New York v. City of New York, 713 N.Y.S.2d 360 (N.Y. App.
Div. 2000); see also Elder, supra note 6, at 784; Spitzer Sues to Block Auction of
Garden Sites, N.Y. Times (May 11, 1999), http://www.
nytimes.com/1999/05/11/nyregion/metro-news-briefs-new-york-spitzer-suesto-block-auction-of-garden-sites.html.
92
Elder, supra note 6, at 784.
93
See Peñalver & Katyal, supra note 90, at 15 (arguing for an
understanding of property law that accounts for “evolving community values”).
94
Memorandum of Agreement between the State of New York and the City
of New York regarding the GreenThumb Program §§ 4-6 (Sept. 17, 2002)
(discussed in Elder, supra note 6, at 786-87). The Agreement expired in 2010,
and the status of the gardens is now governed by regulations of the New York
City Department of Parks & Recreation, 56 RCNY 6 (2010), and the New York
City Department of Housing, Preservation, and Development, 28 RCNY 48
(2010). These two Departments largely continue the approach under the
Agreement.
95
Crossfield, supra note 14.
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Love, supra note 57.
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Rather, the building’s generation of electricity prompted a lawsuit by the local
investor-owned utility, Consolidated Edison, for in effect occupying its power
grid97—infringing on a core property concept of exclusive control.98 Ultimately,
this unique application of wind power was approved by New York State’s Public
Service Commission and vindicated by the federal government as a precedent for
the principle of cogeneration in the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of
1978,99 which required utilities to purchase electric power from entities capable
of producing power at a lower cost than that of the utility.100
During this era, the Urban Homesteading Assistance Board began working
on the City’s then-devastated housing stock, in initiatives that it currently
carries out under the auspices of the Tenant Interim Leasing program: these
programs entail training residents in City-owned properties in building
management and self-governance, and converting the buildings into limitedequity cooperatives for a modest investment by the residents.101 Other occupants
of City-owned buildings who were not participating in the early homesteading
programs, although similarly animated by the values of self-help and community
control of abandoned spaces,102 remained essentially squatters; they faced a more
precarious legal status, especially after the City withdrew its involvement in
homesteading programs.
Increasingly, occupants of squatted buildings offered a highly critical
perspective about urban housing policy. Beginning in the latter half of the 1980s,
some squatters saw themselves as part of a broader movement advocating for
access to low-income housing beyond their own individual needs.103 They also
Id.
See Peñalver & Katyal, supra note 90, at 10.
99
Love, supra note 57. The text of the statute is located at Pub. L. 95-617,
92 Stat. 3117 (1978).
100
Public Utility Regulatory Policy Act (PURPA), Union of
Concerned Scientists, http://www.ucsusa.org/clean_energy/smartenergy-solutions/strengthen-policy/public-utility-regulatory.html#.VE1HH
74Q7zI (last visited July 24, 2014).
101
History, Urban Homesteading Assistance Bd.,
http://uhab.org/history (last visited July 24, 2014); Philosophy, Urban
Homesteading Assistance Bd., http://uhab.org/about (last visited July
24, 2014).
102
Tom Angotti, New York for Sale: Community Planning
Confronts Global Real Estate 98 (2008).
103
Andrew Van Kleunen, The Squatters: A Chorus of Voices . . . But Is Anyone
Listening?, in From Urban Village to East Village: The Battle
for New York’s Lower East Side 285, 289-302 (Janet L. Abu-Lughod
ed., 1994) (discussing squatters’ objections to a City-backed cross subsidy plan
in 1987, in which the City would sell unoccupied lots to developers for marketrate housing and local housing advocates would rehabilitate existing City-owned
structures as affordable housing; the plan was criticized as inevitably promoting
gentrification over the entire area of development). Cf. Tom Angotti, supra
note 102, at 101 (describing squatters from the 1990s as an “eclectic mix,”
which included anti-gentrification activists but also comprised others who were
interested in avoiding rent payments or opposed to plans to develop affordablehousing units on the sites they occupied).
97
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faced more sustained removal efforts as the City in the late 1980s and 1990s
began regularly to pursue evictions and demolitions of purportedly unsafe and
“vacant” buildings to facilitate the sale of the lots to developers.104 In response,
some squatters became identified with obstructionist protest tactics, ranging
from pitching rocks and eggs to launching M-80 explosives,105 while others opted
for absurdist behavior calculated to generate media attention. 106 In one
celebrated incident, a number of squatter activists opened bags that contained
thousands of crickets during an auction for garden lots and a parcel housing
Charas, a cherished community center also slated for development.107
A heavily publicized example of the City’s enforcement efforts occurred in
the mid-1990s, as tenants in five buildings on the Lower East Side’s East
Thirteenth Street asserted a right to remain on the property under an adverse
possession theory—long-term, open, continuous occupancy of property owned
of record by another.108 After the City won the right to evict tenants from two of
the buildings in 1995, it famously enforced the order, amid resistance and efforts
at obstructionism, with a heavy police presence and an armored personnel
carrier.109 That vehicle has become an iconic reminder of the intensity of a
dispute involving contending theories of the basis of the right to occupy and use
land.110 In 1996, the occupants of the three other buildings were also evicted;
they were unable to meet the requirements of adverse possession111 under an
arguably more tenant-favorable interpretation of the law prevailing at that
time,112 a version that the New York State Legislature has since amended to

Mele, supra note 2, at 273.
Id. at 270-75.
106
Ben Shepard, From the Tenement Museum to Bluestockings, the Museum of
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Museum]. The participants in the protest were arrested. Id. at 44.
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Id.
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in the East Village, N.Y. Times (Aug. 14, 1996), http://www.nytimes.com/
1996/08/14/nyregion/police-evict-squatters-from-three-city-owned-tenementsin-the-east-village.html?smid=pl-share.
109
Mele, supra note 2, 299-300. A photograph of the vehicle and New
York Police Department officers seeking to remove squatters from the buildings
is on display at the Museum of Reclaimed Urban Space, 155 Avenue C, on New
York’s Lower East Side.
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Lueck, supra note 108.
111
Id.
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Before the New York State Legislature clarified the definition of “claim
of right” in 2008, New York’s high court had stated the rule for adverse
possession more favorably to squatters. Discussing New York precedent, the
court indicated that adverse possession would defeat deed title even if the
possessor had knowledge of the deed: “Conduct will prevail over knowledge,
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rights by the adverse possessors (citation omitted).” Walling v. Przybylo, 851
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require a showing of a “reasonable basis” for a belief that property belongs to the
adverse possessor.113
In their study of “property outlaws,” Eduardo Moises Peñalver and Sonya
Katyal argue that deliberate law breaking, such as squatting, often is the response
of those with limited resources, and can serve both an “acquisitive” goal—
acquiring something that the lawbreaker lacks—or an “expressive” purpose—
focusing attention on a failing or unfairness in the law.114 Therefore, deliberate
law breaking can exert pressure on rules, including their manner of
interpretation and enforcement, and in this sense, contribute to property law’s
capacity to evolve.115 Considered in relation to this framework, squatting on the
Lower East Side demonstrated both aspects of intentional law breaking:
squatters occupy and appropriate real property owned by another, generally the
City, and squatting became increasingly associated with a radical critique of the
lack of affordable housing in the City, as well as with unorthodox oppositionist
tactics.116 Squatters’ motivations in the late 1980s and 1990s for actively resisting
the City’s efforts to remove them seemed to encompass both a response to their
113
In 2008, the New York Legislature amended the statute defining the
elements of adverse possession to include a showing of a “claim of right”:

Adverse possession; defined: For the purposes of this article: 1.
Adverse possessor. A person or entity is an "adverse possessor" of real
property when the person or entity occupies real property of another
person or entity with or without knowledge of the other's superior
ownership rights, in a manner that would give the owner a cause of
action for ejectment. 2. Acquisition of title. An adverse possessor gains
title to the occupied real property upon the expiration of the statute of
limitations for an action to recover real property pursuant to
subdivision (a) of section two hundred twelve of the civil practice law
and rules, provided that the occupancy, as described in sections five
hundred twelve and five hundred twenty-two of this article, has been
adverse, under claim of right, open and notorious, continuous,
exclusive, and actual. 3. Claim of right. A claim of right means a
reasonable basis for the belief that the property belongs to the adverse
possessor or property owner, as the case may be. Notwithstanding any
other provision of this article, claim of right shall not be required if the
owner or owners of the real property throughout the statutory period
cannot be ascertained in the records of the county clerk, or the register
of the county, of the county where such real property is situated, and
located by reasonable means.
N.Y. Real Prop. Acts. Law § 501 (McKinney 2014). The showing of a
reasonable basis now required by statute would appear to bar a claim of adverse
possession of the kind advanced by the Thirteenth Street squatters: “An
awareness that others own the property within the statutory 10-year period will
defeat any claim of right.” D’Argenio v. Ashland Bldg., LLC, 910 N.Y.S.2d 550
(N.Y. App. Div. 2010) (citation omitted). The shift in New York law is
consistent with a developing trend in the U.S. to eliminate a remedy for the
intentional or “bad faith” adverse possessor who knows that the property at
issue is owned by another. Peñalver & Katyal, supra note 90, at 151.
114
Peñalver & Katyal, supra note 90, at 16-17.
115
Id. at 15-16.
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individual plight and a more general critique of City policies and practices,
although these motivations were perhaps difficult to disentangle.117
If the legal status of Lower East Side’s squatters shifted from homesteaders
in the 1970s to outlaws, transgressors against property, as well as perhaps social
propriety in the 1990s,118 the status of many Lower East Side squatters changed
again in 2002. The new administration of Mayor Michael Bloomberg carried
forward a surprise reversal in policy by outgoing Mayor Rudolph Giuliani119 by
entering into an agreement with the Urban Homesteading Assistance Board
(UHAB). 120 By the agreement’s terms, UHAB purchased eleven squatted
buildings from the City for one dollar each, arranged for financing to bring the
buildings into code compliance, and helped residents of each building form a
cooperative association (a housing development fund company)121 as a vehicle for
self-governance and limited-equity apartment ownership for a modest purchase
amount—$250—122 with the support of a property tax exemption, and with
limits on the resale price.123
For the former squatters, the legal meaning of the agreement seems clear: by
the stroke of a pen, the accord transformed them from trespassers—property
outlaws—to co-op shareholders and, in effect, apartment owners. At the same
time, the legal import of these arrangements has produced some ambivalence;
although the agreement with the City secured affordable housing for individuals
whose situation had long been legally vulnerable, the financial terms of the
construction loan repayment for which they are legally responsible might prove
onerous. Specifically, these arrangements have led to charges of mismanagement
and delay against UHAB, some refinancing of these loans, and even an effort to
assert adverse possession on a building-wide basis.124 The restrictions on resale
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http://www.evgrieve.com/2009/05/bullet-space-is-first-of-former-les.html;
Crossfield, supra note 119.
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Anderson, supra note 122 (quoted in Bullet Space, supra note 123). The
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tightened the adverse possession law. See Bullet Space, supra note 123. The
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price have also generated complaints resulting in some upward adjustments, as
objecting residents pointed to the market value added to the buildings over the
years through their own labor.125 The social meaning of the squatters’ new status
may be similarly nuanced; the unconventional and more radicalized dimensions
of life that a number of the Lower East Side squatters had famously pursued
might seem compromised, or perhaps too domesticated by the new
arrangements.
Although differences over the extent and exchange value of individual sweat
equity investments have divided a number of the buildings’ residents, the
agreement with UHAB has significance beyond the meaning it holds for the
individuals it covers. 126 By offering a framework rooted in cooperative
governance, the agreement memorializes community-based ideas of shared effort
that former squatters lived out informally since the 1970s, while they occupied
and rehabilitated what were, at times, dangerously substandard structures. The
community-enhancing norms of collective ownership and democratic
governance incorporated into housing development fund companies contribute
to both the legal and social meaning of the agreement by illuminating the
relationship between rules governing property and community-driven initiative
and investment.
IV. A Museum for a Movement: Reclaiming Meaning for Abandoned Urban
Space
Housed in the cramped main floor and basement of a refurbished Lower
East Side tenement building, the Museum of Reclaimed Urban Space (MORUS)
opened in December 2012, just weeks after Superstorm Sandy had surged over
large swaths of the floodplain where the Lower East Side sits. The Museum was
itself a victim of water damage that delayed its opening.127 Billed as an “archive
of the unthinkable,”128 MORUS is dedicated to preserving the history of the
had highlighted its expertise in the intricacies of adverse possession claims.
Anderson currently describes its practice in this area in the following terms:
Adam Leitman Bailey, P.C. has taken dozens of buildings from
being squats to homesteader status and eventually owners all over New
York City. We have obtained grants for many millions of dollars for
some buildings to do necessary repairs and renovations and negotiated
loans for others. Our firm has gone to battle when necessary to ensure
that the money, repairs and renovations as well as other promises have
been completed by contractors, governmental agents or other entities.
Mitchell-Lama Representation/ Housing Development Fund Corporation (HDFC)
and Third Party Transfer Building Representation, Adam Leitman Bailey,
P.C., http://www.alblawfirm.com/index.cfm?pageid=6&itemID=1556 (last
visited July 24, 2014).
125
Anderson, supra note 122.
126
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127
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Stephen Duncombe, It Happened and Somebody Noticed, in Museum of
Reclaimed Urban Space Opening — A Moment’s Catalog
December 8, 2012, 5, 6 (Benjamin Shepard ed., 2013).
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community gardens, squatting, and bicycle advocacy environmentalism
movements.129
The Museum’s host building, located on Avenue C, and popularly known as
“See Sqwat,” is one of the eleven buildings covered under the City’s 2002
agreement with UHAB.130 Long identified as a “punk squat,” See Sqwat housed
a mosh pit and space in one portion of the basement for band performances.131
Longtime residents recall a time when the building lacked stairs, leading
residents to use netting to hoist themselves up to their apartments, a procedure
likened to “scaling the rigging of an old sailing ship.”132 See Sqwat residents are
among the cohort of volunteers who have built the Museum. 133
Leading walking tours and workshops, and using photographs, community
newspapers, and other material artifacts of place-based activism, MORUS offers
perspectives on how the community gardens, squatting, and bicycle advocacy
environmentalism movements helped reclaim Lower East Side properties from
abandonment and disinvestment in the 1970s and from the City’s later efforts to
sell off the properties for redevelopment.134 The Museum’s programming seeks
to connect the neighborhood’s history of activism with the principle of
sustainability, particularly as local community groups have found new uses for
the neighborhood’s abandoned lots,135 uses that transformed Avenue C (and
environs) from the “lunar landscape” it had come to resemble in 1980.136
As one commentator has noted, MORUS documents “defiant direct action
designed to rebuild a city out of the rubble of a fiscal crisis and planned
shrinkage.”137 In preserving a record of art interventions and arrests, lawsuits
and garden occupations, MORUS also offers interpretation, drawing meaning
from the acts of landlords, City officials, and the community initiatives that
reclaimed ravaged and abandoned spaces and reintegrated them as community
spaces. The narrative that MORUS tells makes clear that these initiatives
sometimes entailed property outlawry, but it also offers a critical view of
property rules and government policies, inviting consideration of inequity that
may inhere in those rules and policies.
In the first anniversary edition of the MORUS opening catalogue, a
contributor recalled how the activists that MORUS memorialized “transformed
a material and political landscape with our ideals of how things could be.”138
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That insight—that the act of reclaiming is also transformative—is part of the
essential meaning that the users, owners, and regulators of reintegrated spaces
will draw from this history.
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